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[L. A. No. 23320.

III Bank.

Apr. 29, 1955.J

GERTRUDE ELSBETH MUELLER, Respondent, v. KURT
HANS MUELLER, AppellantI'
[1] Divoree-Evidenee.-Evidence that husband frequently cursed
wife, broke dishes, brandished poker over her and one of children, threw radio out of house when her playing it disturbed
him and on at least two occasions beat her; that she was afraid
of him, that her mental health was seriously impaired, that
on one occasion she returned home to find that he had taken
pills and was unconscious on floor, and that she admitted
committing adultery with two men, together with evidence that
both parties made unsuccessful attempts to reconcile their
differences, justified trial court in concluding that legitimate
objects of marriage had been destroyed, that its continuation
was seriously impairing wife's health and threatened husband's
health, that it involved atmosphere of bitterness and hatred
in home that was deleterious to interests of children, and
that marriage should be- terminated.
[2] Id.-Recrimination.-When each of parties has given the other
grounds for divorce, court may grant divorce to both, and
it is clothed with broad discretion to advance requireru,.ents
of justice in each partiCUlar case.
HeX. Dig. References: [1)

[4-8] Divorce, § 198.

Divol'ce~

§ 101;

[2~

3) Divorce, § 60;

)
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[3] Id.-Recrimination.-Comparative guilt of parties to divorce
action may have important bearing on whether or not either
one or both should be granted relief.
[4] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-When divorce is granted to both
.parties, alimony may be awarded to either, since basis of liability for alimony is granting of divorce against person required to pay it. (Civ. Code, § 139.)
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Adultery of wife does not compel
trial court to deny her alimony when both parties have been
guilty of marital fault.
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Facts that legitimate objects of
matrimony have been destroyed and that no purpose would be
served by maintaining marriage do not, standing alone, provide basis for allowing husband to escape obligation of support he assumed and which he would be compelled to discharge
if divorce were denied.
[7] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Comparative guilt of parties is only
one of considerations that are important in determining
whether alimony should be granted.
[8] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-In any particular case adultery
mayor may not constitute greater fault than that of other
party, and where it cannot be said as matter of law that wife's
infidelities occurring over period of three months approximately two years before her divorce action was filed were
necessarily more outrageous than husband's course of continuous cruel conduct toward her that involved physical attacks and beatings and seriously endangered her health, and
where she had been married to him for 16 years prior to
institution of action, was mother of three children who needed
her care, and her health was impaired to such extent that her
earning capacity was problematical for immediate future, trial
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to deny her alimony
on ground of her own marital fault.

APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Jerold E. Weil, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for divorce, and cross-complaint for similar relief.
Judgment awarding divorce to both parties affirmed.
[3] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce
cases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and
Separation, § 61; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233.
[4] Allowance of permanent alimony to wife against whom
divorce is graItted, note, 34 A.L.R.2d 313. See also Cal.Jur.2d,
Divorce and Separation, § 201 et seq.; Am.Jur., Divorce and
Separation, § 586 et seq.
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Krag & Sweet and William L. Mock for Appellant.
Dockweiler & Dockweiler and Frederick C. Dockweiler for
Respondent.
TRA YNOR J.-On September 30, 1952, plaintiff Gertrude
Mueller tiled this action for divorce against defendant Kurt
Mueller alleging extreme cruelty. Defendant cross-complained for divorce alleging extreme cruelty and adultery.
The parties were married in 1936 and have three children who
were 15, 12, and 9 years of age at the time of the trial. Plaintiff testified that it had been a bad marriage and that she had
wanted a divorce when she was first pregnant. Defendant
frequently cursed plaintiff and broke dishes and on one occasion he brandished a poker over her and one of the children
and then dashed it into the fireplace. He threw a radio out
of the house when plaintiff's playing it disturbed him, and on
at least two occasions he beat her. She was afraid of him. and
her mental health has been seriously impaired. On one occasion when she left the house in fear, he threatened to break
everything in the place if she did not return at once, and
when she returned she found that he had taken pills and was
unconscious on the floor. She admitted-eommitting adultery
with two men in August, September, and October of 1950 and
testified that she had told her husband about these incidents
and that they had continued regular sexual relations thereafter. Defendant denied much of the foregoing testimony,
but he admitted that he had beaten plaintiff on one oecasion.
He also testified that she made unfounded accusations of infidelity against him. Both parties made attempts to reconcile
their difficulties but to no avail. On the basis of the foregoing evidence and other evidence, much of which was corroborated by other witnesses, the trial court found that each
of the parties had treated the other with extreme cruelty
and that plaintiff had committed adultery. It also found that
both of the parties were fit and proper persons to have
custody of the children and ~hat it was for their best interests that their custody be awarded to plaintiff. Judgment
was entered granting each of the parties an interlocutory
decree of divorce against the other, awarding custody of the
children to plaintiff, dividing the community property, and
awarding plaintiff $200 per month alimony and $210 per
month for the support of the children. Defendant appeals
from the entire judgment except that part thereof granting
him an interlocutorl' decree of divorce from plainti1L
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing

to find that his cause of action for divorce was in bar of
plaintiff's cause of action (see Civ. Code, § 122), and in
awarding alimony to a wife found guilty of adultery. We
can~ot agree with these contentions.
[1] The trial court was justified in concluding that the
legitimate objects of the marriage had been destroyed, that
its continuation was seriously impairing plaintiff's health
and threatening defendant's health, and that it involved an
atmosphere of bitterness and hatred in the home that was
clearly deleterious to the interests of the children. Accordingly, it did not err in determining that the marriage should
be terminated. (De Bttrgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 872873 [250 P.2d 598]; Phillips v. Phillips, 41 Ca1.2d 869,
876-877 [264 P.2d 926].) It remains to be determined, however, whether it erred in granting a divorce to both of the
parties and awarding alimony to plaintiff.
[2] When each of the parties has given the other grounds
tor divorce, the court may grant a divorce to both, and it
"is clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements of justice in each particular case." [3, 4] The comparative guilt of the parties" may have an important bearing
upon whether or not either one or both should be granted
relief, " and when "a divorce is granted to both, alimony may
be awarded to either, for the basis of liability for alimony
is the granting of a divorce against the person required to pay
it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.)" (De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra,
39 Ca1.2d 858, 872-874; Phillips v. Phillips, supra, 41 Ca1.2d
869, 877; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 125 Cal.App.2d 239, 242
[270 P.2d 80].) Although there is authority to the contrary
(see Phelps v. Phelps, 176 Ky. 456 [195 S.W. 779, 780];
Knight v. Knight, 209 Ga. 131 [70 S.E.2d 770, 771] ; 9 A.L.R.
2d 1026), in the absence of statutory provisions expressly
prohibiting an award of alimony to a wife guilty of adultery
(see Borden v. Borden, 156 Fla. 770 [23 So.2d 529]; 34
A.L.R.2d 313, 349), it has frequently been held in other
jurisdictions that the wife's adultery does not necessarily
cause her to forfeit her right to alimony. (Pauly v. Pauly
14 Okla. 1 [76 P. 148]; Cross v. Cross, 63 N.H. 444, 446;
Jaffe v. Jaffe, 124 F.2d 233, 234 [74 App.D.C. 394] ; Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563, 564; Graves v. Graves,
108 Mass. 314, 318; Lunsford v. Lunsford, 232 Ala. 368 [168
So. 188, 190]; Ashcroft v. Ashcroft [1902] Pl'ob. 270, 277,
O.A.; Edwards v. Edwards [1894] Probe 33, 38; see also
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AUdredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504 [229 P.2d 681, 685,
34 A.L.R.2d 305] ; MacDonald v. MacDonald, - - Utah - [236 P.2d 1066, 1069] ; Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wash.2d 139
[260 P.2d 878, 881]; Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799,-r812;
Larson v. Larson, 2 Ill.2d 451 [118 N.E.2d 433, 434J ; Edwards
v. Edwards, 222 Ark. 626 [262 S.\V.2d 130, 133].) [5] Although many of these cases arose in jurisdictions that permit
an award of alimony to a guilty wife even if her husband is
blameless, the principle they enunciate is even more applicable in a state such as California in which the guilty ~ife
may receive alimony only if she is granted a divorce against
a husband who is also guilty of marital fault. They recognize
that comparative guilt is only one factor in determining
whether alimony should be awarded and that the needs of the
wife and the ability of the husband to provide for her are
also important, and they protect the interest of society in not
having a wife left destitute. They counsel the wisdom of
caution before adopting any arbitrary rule that would fetter
discretion and require the trial court to deny alimony merely
because the wife has been guilty of adultery. As pointed out
by the Supreme Court of Utah in dealing with a similar problem, "Great caution is necessary to prevent the contentions
and strife which frequently exist in contested divorce cases
from distorting the judgment by placing extraordinary emphasis on particular instances of blameworthy conduct or
some unusual sacrifice or contribution in some one phase of
the overall picture." (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra,
236 P.2d 1066, 1069.) "It certainly does not comport with
good conscience to turn such an unfortunate individual out
to fend for herself after having given 29 years to this marriage, good or bad as her conduct may have been." (Ibid.)
••. . . a wife of long standing does not forfeit all right to
alimony or a share in the property because of recent misconduct nor in cases where the husband may be equally at fault
nor in cases where there is a doubtful preponderance against
the wife because judges, being human, cannot penetrate the
family drama with complete understanding. Perhaps such a
forfeiture of alimony may not be out of proportion in the
case where a young wife guilty of acts of moral turpitude,
has opportunity to start married life anew but in a ca~e such
as this it would be out of all proportion." (Alldt·edge v .
. Alldredge, supra, 119 Utah 504 [229 P.2d 681, 685. 34

A.L.R.2d 305].)
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Our conclusion that the adultery of the wife does not
compel the trial court to deny her alimony, when both of the
parties have been guilty of marital fault finds furthe·r support
in the cases in which divorces were denied on the ground of
recrimination. Were we to overrule the De Burgh case, as
defendant contends we should do, his own fault would prevent granting him the divorce he sought and secured, and
despite her adultery, his duty to support plaintiff would remain. (Mattson v. Mattson, 181 Cal. 44, 48 [183 P. 443];
Mohr v. Mohr, 33 Cal.App.2d 274, 276-278 [91 P.2d 238];
Goetting v. Goetting, 80 Cal.App. 363, 370 [252 P. 6561;
Broad v. Broad, 35 Cal.App. 646, 647 [170 P. 658].) [6] The
fact that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and that no purpose is served by maintaining the
marriage do not, standing alone, provide a basis for allowing defendant to escape the obligation of support he assumed
and which he would be compelled to discharge if a divorce
were denied.
[7] It is true, as the De Burgh case recognized, that the
comparative guilt of the parties may have an important
bearing on the relief that is granted. As pointed out above,
however, it is only one of the considerations that are important in determining whether alimony should be granted.
[8] Moreover, in any partiCUlar case adultery mayor may not
constitute greater fault than that of the other party, and in
the present case we cannot say as a matter of law that
plaintiff's infidelities occurring over a period of three months
approximately two years before the action was filed were
necessarily more outrageous than defendant's course of continuous cruel conduct toward plaintiff that involved physical
attacks and beating~ and seriously endangered her health.
Plaintiff had been married to defendant for 16 years when
this action was commenced, she is the mother of three children
who need her care, and her health has been impaired to such
an extent that her earning capacity is problematical for the
immediate future. Under these circumstances the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to deny her alimony
on the ground of her own marital fault.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concmrred.
EDMONDS, J.-I adhere to the conclusions which I stated
in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 874-882 [250 P.2d
P.98j. B¥ mandata of the Legislature, & divOl'ee ":m.u.a be de-

)

Died" upon a showing of recrimination. (Civ. Code, § 111.)
Recrimination is defined as "a showing by the defendant of
any cause of action against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's
cause of action." (Civ. Code, § 122.) In my opinion, because of these statutes there is no legal basis whatever for
allowing each party to an action for divorce to obtain a decree
severing the marital relationship_
The contrary conclusion reached in the De Burgh case rests
upon a totally untenable construction of the words "in bar."
It allows the trial judge to grant a divorce in a situation in
which, under section 111 of the Civil Code, relief must be denied. To some persons that result may seem to be a desirable
socia) policy. In my opinion, it amounts to a repeal. by
judicial decision, of the legislative mandate.
I would overrule the De Burgh case and the decisions which
have followed it and reverse the present judgment.
Shenk, J _, and Spence, J _, concurred.
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